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THE INTERACTION OF CIVIL LAW
AND COMMERCIAL LAW
Enrique Lalaguna Dominguez*
DISTINCTION AND INTERACTION BETWEEN
CIVIL LAW AND COMMERCIAL LAW
In the Spanish law, civil law and commercial law appear to be
two distinct disciplines. Legislative autonomy permits one to define
with clarity the norms, or rules, inherent in each, which justifies the
separation of the study of these disciplines into the scientific and didactic orders. In reality, a vital interaction between civil law and commercial law can be perceived.
There are, certainly, legal relations that are subjected in an exclusive manner to the province of one body of legislation or the other.
The basic juridical relations of the state, the condition and legal capacity of people, family relations, and relations within succession law are
genuine juridical civil relations. Such relations that derive from the
bill of exchange, those that exist in companies, and those that arise
from financial transactions are typical commercial relations. In addition to these, which are clearly framed in the civil or commercial
legislation, there are others whose effects are produced in an area
where both bodies of legislation overlap. Those relations that are subject to the double incidence of civil and commercial law constitute
the main subject of this work.
Among the principal considerations that link civil and commercial
legislation, the following may be pointed out as being the most
important:
1. An initial group of relations is produced when civil law and
commercial law converge within the same juridical situation, in which
case the effects are determined in part by civil law rules and in part
by commercial law rules;
2. Another type of relationship may be
ing incidence of civil legislation, either as
general law, governing juridical relations
whenever a commercial law presents itself

perceived in the continuprivate ius commune or
of a commercial nature
as a special private law;

3. There are other relationships derived from the changes that
contemporary juridical experience, and particularly the economic and
social reality of the business world, introduce into the classical limits
of the interaction between both disciplines.
*

Professor of Civil Law, University of Valencia; Member, General Committee

for Codification.
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In the analysis of these considerations, it is important to keep in mind
the basic unity of the private law within the limits of which the civil
law and commercial law are positioned.
UNITY OF PRIVATE LAW AS THE FOUNDATION OF THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW

The Correspondence Between Civil Law and Ius commune
When speaking of the unity of private law as the point of departure for the study of the reciprocal influences between civil law and
commercial law, it is helpful to point out that such unity should not
be confused with the phenomenon of legislative unity, or unification,
in the regulation of matters that formerly received separate legal
treatment. This is the case, for example, of the recent Law 50 of October 8, 1980, which went into effect in 1981. That law abolished articles 1791 to 1979 of the Civil Code and articles 380 to 438 of the
,Commercial Code. While Law 50 constitutes the formal regulation of
a matter, in speaking of the unity of the private law, I am referring
to the internal systematic unity of private law as a whole, as
distinguished from the ambit of public law.
Within the private law, civil law and commercial law are
distinguished as two separate juridical branches, each being
autonomous. The content and substance of civil law, as well as its
significance and function as ius commune, are unquestionable. (This
relationship between civil law and ius commune will be treated subsequently.) On the other hand, the precise significance of the autonomy
that commercial law undeniably enjoys is arguable. For this reason,
it seems necessary to explain, at least briefly, the framework in which
commercial law will be examined in this work.
Significance of Commercial Law as Special Private Law
If there is a common factor in the appreciation of the comercial
law autonomy, that factor is, without a doubt, that the unique
characteristics of this discipline in contrast to the civil law is probably stressed too much. This overemphasis has obscured a less
profound consideration of the reciprocal relationships and influences
between both sectors of the law. Considering commercial law as special
law (ius speciale) or particular law (ius singulare), doctrinal writers
attempt to make evident those characteristics which in a most
energetic way reflect the specific consistency of the discipline itself.
On the other hand, the civil law doctrine, interested fundamentally
in the problem of the unity of law, has tried to underscore the thematic
and scientific continuity of special laws and private general law.
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The subject of the autonomy of commercial law is positioned between two extremes. It has been said that jurists have vainly
discussed whether commercial law is, in contrast to civil law, a special
law or a law for a particular transaction, i.e., an "exceptional" law.
Even though from the general point of view of the civil law, one position as well as the other may seem one-sided in emphasizing the unique nature of commercial law, thereby obscuring the fundamental fact
of its involvement with general law, it nevertheless seems that the
idea of specialization does not involve the tendency toward separation so often designated as the unique feature of the commercial law.
With the question raised in these terms, to consider commercial
law as "exceptional" law would indicate that it posesses an independent system of norms, or rules, endowed with its own principles that
are contrary, or at least different from, those of the ius commune.
In that case, to affirm its independence from civil law would be
pointless. Furthermore, the system itself is referred to as both common and exceptional; thus, to think of commercial law as a whole as
exceptional law is senseless. The concept of "special law," however,
has a different meaning. As a normative reality it constitutes a set
of provisions different from those of the ius commune but integrated
into it, the two being bound in their genesis and development to the
doctrinal tradition and to the order of principles and norms normally
associated with the latter. In considering commercial law as special
law linked to the system of civil law, it is helpful to speak of commercial norms, or rules, of exceptional character, rules that do not
constitute a particular deviation from the general principles, but a
deviation from the system itself.
Commercial law is special private law in respect to the civil law,
just as it is in respect to the ius commune. This means that commercial law has its own raison d'itre as a different discipline within the
framework of private law, as much as if it were based on civil law
principles and norms and linked scientifically to civil law doctrine.
The application and interpretation of commercial norms is based on
the constant application of the general rules of civil law in its function as ius commune.
It has been pointed out that to a certain extent commercial law
has a genuine raison d'9tre separate from that of the civil law, in
spite of the movement toward unification of the two branches of
private law, and that its independence or autonomy has continued to
exist, even when there has been unified legislative treatment of the
two disciplines. Such unity of legislation has permitted one to define
with greater precision the scope of the specialization of commercial
law and to simplify the private law system, eliminating unnecessary
duplications, such as those that still exist in the Spanish system.
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The second aspect of the specialization of commercial law refers
to its association with the system of rules and the doctrinal tradition
of the civil law. The range of this association at the normative level
is more comprehensive and profound than the formal data concerning
the cross-references between the ius commune and the Commercial
Code would suggest. In dealing with the notion of reciprocal influences
between both disciplines, to admit that there is an involvement with
the scientific order is more radical than what is customarily
acknowledged in this area. In this sense, Garrigues's attitude is exemplary for its clarity and realism. Garrigues notes that in juridical
science there is no method for appreciating or explaining patrimonial
relationships among topics that do not fit within the categories
preserved by the civil law.
This idea, a very accurate one, could be understood to have a double meaning. On the one hand, the characteristics that result from
the heritage of the legal science of commerce should not be forgotten: its relationship with the civil law doctrine is vital and, for that
reason, it is logical that commercial dogma finds in the civil law doctrine, which constantly refurbishes itself, the most prolific source of
critical possibilities with which to confront its problems. On the other
hand, that which is original in the commercial dogma as constructive
criticism of the common body of doctrine should be emphasized: the
most strictly specialized concepts enrich themselves from the perspective which the legal science of commerce has to offer.
Cross-references Between the Commercial Code and the Ius commune
These two fundamental aspects of the specialization of the commercial law-its uniqueness with respect to the civil law and its involvement with the civil law-seem to be reflected, with unequal force,
in the various cross-references that the Commercial Code has made
to the ius commune, sometimes in precepts having limited application
in regard to specific matters and, at other times, in precepts having
a more extensive systematic scope in broad norms, or rules, such as
those of articles 2 and 50. Among the precepts having limited application to specified matters, those referring to the following can be noted:
the contract of deposit (art. 310), the transfer of non-negotiable drafts
that are past due or lack requirements (art. 466), promissory notes
not made payable to order (art. 432(2)), the prescription of actions (art.
943), creditors' privileges in bankruptcy (art. 913, No. 3), proof of acts
and contracts which were negotiated by non-licensed brokers (art.
89(2)). Occasionally, the Commercial Code refers to the "civil law" (arts.
51(1), 913, No. 6). A good number of precepts refer to the basic civil
law as being suppletive to commercial law, as done very precisely
in articles 310 and 943. In others, on the. other hand, the ius commune is referred to, not in its suppletive quality vis-a-vis the Coin-
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mercial Code, but as a system distinct from the commercial law
system, the ius commune being applicable only because of the civil
nature of the juridical act involved, for example, as is explicitly done
in articles 466 (concerning the difference between the endorsement
and transfer of a bill of exchange) and article 532 (concerning the difference between promissory notes having a civil character and those
having a commercial character).
Articles 2 and 50 are more important for the broad terms with
which the cross-referencial precept is formulated with respect to commercial acts and contracts. Especially in these two articles the unmistakable expression of the nature of commercial law as ius speciale
can be seen. The doctrinal recognition, undoubtedly a valid one, results,
nevertheless, in ambiguity if one does not point out, on the one hand,
the peculiar significance that ius commune assumes in the area where
commercial law norms, or rules, are applicable and, on the other hand,
the diverse intensity and effectiveness with which the ius commune
contributes to the refurbishment of commercial law in relation to the
most important changes in the Spanish commercial world since the
publication of the first commercial code in that country.
If these two considerations are not kept in mind, there is the risk
that the cross-referencial precepts from the ius commune will be interpreted in an excessively formalistic sense and there is also the risk
that the specialization of the commercial law, that which makes it
a genuine discipline distinct from the civil law, will be reduced. As
a result, there would be a tendency to separate completely both
disciplines, because of the natural resistence to accepting commercial
law as a simple enclave within the ius commune, or as a set of provisions isolated in the normative sphere of the civil law. With this in
mind, which sometimes leads to the accusation that commercial legislation is "fragmentary," one could considerably diminish the content of
commercial law by admitting that, when the commercial law ceases
to be special and tends to become general, it is converted into ius
commune, according to the historic function that Ascarelli attributed
to special laws. The relationship between commercial law and ius commune has another significance-that relationship is not enriched at
the expense of either the commercial law or the ius commune, but
both gain magnitude and precision from the effect of their reciprocal
influences.
The cross-referencial precepts of the ius commune represent for
the commercial law, not so much a recognition of its limits, as the
expression of a spirit of independence eager to find in the ius commune essential possibilities for its own development. In my opinion,
the significance of the autonomy, or independence, of commercial law
can be summarized as follows:
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1. Civil law and commercial law are evidently different legal
disciplines within the ambit of private law;
2. Two factors contribute to the characterization of commercial
law-the commercial norms, or rules, that are of a special or exceptional nature and the systematic relationship between these norms
and the norms of the civil law;
3. Civil law, which in its function as ius commune is the center
of the so-called special laws, assumes a different significance in regard
to each, and specifically in the realm of commercial law it acquires
an entirely unique meaning that is determined in good measure by
the nature and content of commercial law rules.
OVERLAP OF CIVIL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL LAW LEGISLATION

The Scope of the Application of Commercial Legislation
The co-existence within the Spanish law of (1) specific legislation
concerning commercial matters and (2) civil legislation as suppletive
law applicable to the same matter necessitates the development of
a criterion which will permit a definition of the field of application
of each. It is not an easy task to delineate precisely the criterion for
determining the applicability of commercial law. The Exposd de motifs
of the present Commercial Code formerly stated, in reference to that
criterion, that the definition of commerce "constitutes one of the most
difficult problems in modern science." The Commercial Code of 1821,
the first such code in Spain, contained as the criterion for establishing
the scope of its application the classic concept of commercial law as
a law having a professional character: the characterization of an act
as being commercial was made to depend fundamentally on the
merchant-like situation of the persons who engaged in the act. But
this principle was advanced with some reservations, because the Code
itself acknowledged the possibility that an act could be considered
commercial even when some of the interested parties did not possess
the requisite "merchant quality."
The present Code appears to have adopted an objective criterion.
Article 2 establishes the principle that the "acts of commerce,"
whether or not those who execute them are merchants and whether
or not such acts are specified in this Code, will be governed by the
provisions contained in it; in its absence, by the uses of commerce
generally observed in each locale, and if lacking both, by those of the
general law. According to this, the scope of application of the Commercial Code appears to focus on "acts of commerce" considered as
an objective reality, since such acts need not be expressly specified
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in the code in order to qualify as "acts of commerce." But, to define
this reality, one must turn to the second paragraph of the same article where the formal criterion is set out: "Those [acts] included in
this code" are acts of commerce. The acts of commerce not specified
in the Code are also defined, not on the basis of an objective reality,
but according to a formal criterion, that is, on the basis of the act's
being analogous to those specified in the Code. Strictly speaking, article 2 does not give a concept of the acts of commerce-it limits itself
to affirming what those acts regulated by the Code are, and this is
the only definite criterion for evaluation. From all this it can be deduced, regardless of the intent of the legislator, that the precept does
not contain a definition of "acts of commerce," but instead presents
an order of priority of the sources for the regulation of acts included
in the series of articles in the Code. The application of the Code does
not raise any doubt. The problem arises precisely in respect to acts
that are presumed to be commercial but are not included in the Commercial Code and to those acts that have been designated as unilateral
commercial acts or commercial acts in an improper sense.
Analogous Acts, Acts of Commerce, and
Unilateral Commercial Acts
The acts not specifically contemplated in commercial legislation
and designated by article 2 of the Commercial Code as acts of commerce "of an analogous nature" give rise to some doubt as to which
legislation will be applicable. The question does not resolve itself simply according to the express objective criterion set out in article 2.
This is so because the value of the objective criterion enunciated by
that article of the Commercial Code is relative, for the legislator
himself occasionally abandons that criterion. If by principle it is affirmed that the Code regulates the acts of commerce "whether or not
those who execute them are merchants," later the Code limits the
scope of this principle by taking into account the "quality of merchant"
as a decisive element classifying specific acts and contracts as commercial, as is done in regard to commission (art. 244), deposit (art.
303), loan (art. 311), transportation (art. 349), and the contract of sale
(arts. 325, 236(4)).
In regard to the so-called unilateral commercial acts, the application of the Commercial Code will be limited in each case to those
aspects of the legal relation that are regulated by the Code, precisely
on the basis that, according to the general objective criterion in article 2, the "merchant quality" is in itself irrelevant in order to subject
the legal relation to the province of the commercial law.
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The Concurrent Application of Civil and
Commercial Legislation
A consideration of all the principal categories of contracts
regulated by the Commercial Code reveals that, in general, the commercial character of a juridical act could not be designated as being
independent from a customary dedication to the exercise of commerce.
Specifically, in the debatable presumption of the so-called unilateral
commercial acts, the application of the Commercial Code normally cannot be defined with precise limits, if one pays attention only to the
juridical act, for it is necessary to keep in mind the diverse aspects
of the juridical relation that derive from that act.
The commercial character of a juridical act resides, in my judgment, in the profit-making purpose objectively expressed in the practice of a professional activity, which gives precise commercial sense
to that purpose and permits it to be carried out. The material difference is not found so much in the simple "quality of merchant," nor
in the mere objective consideration of the act, but in the professional
character of the activity that is predicated on the basic profit-making
motive of the juridical act which, as soon as it is dominated by such
activity, reveals itself as an "act of commerce." As for the rest, the
fact that a juridical act is classified as an act of commerce does not
mean that the commercial nature of this act could govern or dictate
all of the effects of the juridical relation derived from it.
A very clear example of this is found when a seller, whose store
is open to the public, sells furniture bound for consumption by the
buyer. This juridical act is not commercial (art. 326(1)), but civil in
nature. The commercial dimension that it could have for the seller
is found, not in the juridical act of sale because the seller is a merchant, but in the value that this juridical civil act has with respect
to a prior juridical act-a purchase bound for resale. The commercial
character of the juridical act of a contract for the purchase and sale
of furniture for consumption does not flow from what the act is in
itself-a civil "sale," but from the significance that the act acquires
later as a singular expression of a commercial activity -commercial
"resale" (art. 325). This commercial dimension of the civil juridical act,
the fact that the object was acquired in the development of a commercial activity (in a store open to the public) explains the effect of
the instant usucapio (Commerical Code art. 85) in favor of the buyer
as opposed to the owner of the merchandise sold. This perscriptive
period is a form of acquisition by the non-owner, who is protected
more vigorously than if he had acquired the merchandise from a nonmerchant (Civ. Code art. 464). This example is especially significant
as an expression of the diversity of aspects (civil and commercial) that
play a statistically dominant role in the field of commercial contract-.
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ing. For a long time there has been no evidence of the dogmatic nature
of a pure "act of commerce."
THE APPLICATION OF CIVIL LEGISLATION,
AS IUS COMMUNE, TO COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

The application of civil laws to juridical relations of a commercial
character is postulated, on the one hand, by the Commercial 'Code
itself in articles 2 and 50 and, on the other hand, by the Civil Code
in article 43), and in similar terms by former article 16. The application of civil law rules within the comprehensive field of juridical commercial relations is notably important when those relations are
developed within the context of contracting. In this respect, one should
pay special attention to the scope of application which may be attributed to article 50 of the Commercial Code. That article states:
"Commercial contracts, in everything which relates to their requirements, modifications, exemptions, interpretation and extinction
and to the capacity of the contracting parties, will be governed, in
what is not specifically established in this Code or in special laws,
by the general rules of the common law [ius commune]." The rule set
forth in article 50 poses two main questions. The first consists of the
need to determine which laws, within the Spanish legal system, constitute the sphere in which those "general rules of common law" are
formulated. More precisely, what is it that should be understood as
"common law" when it is time to complete the rules governing commercial contracts? The second question involves a definition of the
incidence of "common law" within the area of commercial contracts.
The Sphere of "Common Law"
From the time of the promulgation of the first commercial code
in 1829 until the present, the realm of ius commune has undergone
an intense and profound process of renewal. Three stages can be
distinguished in this process.
The present Commercial Code, promulgated by Law 22 of August
1885, did not reflect logically the significance with which the expression "common law" was later used in the Civil Code, as being the
opposite of ancient local law. Nevertheless, the prevailing opinion
within the current commercial doctrine considers that the general law
invoked in the Commercial Code is the so-called Castilian civil law.
This opinion, however, must be more precisely deliniated. The
significance of the expression "common law" in article 50 of the present Commercial Code could be linked to the significance attributed
to the same expression in article 234(1) of the Code of Sainz de Andino. According to doctrinal interpretation at the time, that expression represented the legal consecration of "common law" as the
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Spanish civil law of general application in the first quarter of the 19th
century. This precept is linked in its historical genesis to the moment
at which the Roman law definitively lost its authority in favor in the
"royal law" of Spain, with the latter taking the name of "common
law" which, until then, had been claimed by the former. It is interesting to point out along this line, and in reference to present article 50, that by the end of the 19th century jurisprudence considered
it necessary to declare that in commercial contractual matters neither
the Institutes nor the Digest could be considered as suppletive law.
The historical circumstances of this tension between Roman law
and Castilian civil law permit one to define very clearly the limits
of the expression "common law" in the Commercial Code. That expression refers certainly to the Castilian civil law, but only insofar
as its ultimate application serves the function ius commune when the
Roman law would otherwise have been applicable. In no way does
this imply that on the level of commercial legislation there has been
a expansive generalization of Castilian civil law so that it extends
over the areas where the civil law proper or regional laws are
applicable.
With the promulgation of the Civil Code, the expression "common law" has become synomynous with "codified civil law." When
one speaks of "common law" or "general private law" it is customary
to invoke former article 16 of the Civil Code, which states: "In matters that are governed by special laws, the deficiencies of those will
be supplied by the provisions of the Code." In the appraisal of this
rule, its own historical development must be kept in mind. In drafting article 16, our legislature was thinking more of the past than of
the future. Actually the equation between general law, or ius commune, and the Civil Code, which in reality had never been exact, could
be maintained. When one considers the mentality of the era in which
the Code was promulgated, one sees that article 16 reflects the conviction that the Code inherited the position which Castilian law formerly held. The drafters of the Code realized the magnitude of their task
and were aware of the Code's defects. The special laws of the past
century historically imply that progress was made but, they represent, on the other hand, a period of lassitude and failure in the process of codification. Those special laws appear as minor accomplishments in view of the reality of the Civil Code, the most important legislative work of the 19th century. This is fundamentally
the meaning of article 16, which is expressive of the conspicuous value
of the code, with regard to the special laws that for practical reasons
were never integrated into it.
The perception that the Civil Code included the ius commune has
been maintained until recent times. When one speaks of ius commune
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one still thinks of the Civil Code; but, the reality is that the Code,
our fundamental civil law, is not longer the exclusive province of the
ius commune. An important set of special laws, being strictly civil
in nature, today share with the Code the status of ius commune. That
the Civil Code is not the exclusive source of the ius commune can
be maintained without serious opposition; the statutes regulating mortgages, which are not contained in the Civil Code, are a good example
of this fact. In the same measure that those statutes are civil law,
they are also ius commune, and the same-should be attributed to all
other laws that have an unmistakeable civil character and are promulgated subsequent to the effective date of the Code but are not
incorporated into it, as for example those laws which have a more
immediate continuity with commercial law: the laws governing chattel mortgages, the Usury Law of July 23, 1908, the Arbitration Law
of December 22, 1953, the Cooperative Property Law of July 21, 1960,
and the Law of the Sale of Furniture on Credit of July 17, 1965. The
expression "special laws" should not be understood in a merely formal sense, because that would lead one to ignore the ius commune
status of those laws which have a civil character. In another sense,
such a view would prevent one from realizing that the "special"
character of such laws is simply the result of the natural phenomenon
of. evolution. In this evolutionary process, the Code has maintained
its importance as the basic civil law and, in this sense, retains its
prestige as ius commune. But, since the refurbishing of the civil law
has taken place in great measure apart from the normative framework
of the Code, the Civil Code has departed from the ius commune,
although it does remain the very best part of the basic law of Spain.
On the other hand, in addition to the ius commune status of those
civil laws that are called special because of the matter which they
regulate, there is a group of civil laws that have been denominated
special because they have a limited scope of application, laws which
are also considered "common law," or ius commune. Those civil laws
that are called special because of their application to a definite area
are contained today in the regional law compilations, such as those
of Aragon, Catalonia, Baleares, Galicia, Vizcaya y Alava, and Navarra.
In view of the problems which could arise in commercial contracting
because of the insufficiency of rule in the Commercial Code, the existence of those regional compilations determines that a rule from the
local laws should be applied as the suppletive law in preference over
a rule of the Civil Code. The following example will help to illustrate
this point.
The law to be applied in Catalonia in regard to a married woman
who acts as a surety for her husband, which is considered a commercial contract, is the "general rules of common law" under article 50
of the Commercial Code. The accommodation endorsement given by
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the wife is a "commercial" contract under article 439 of the Commercial Code, but the validity of that contract with respect to the capacity of the surety depends upon the rules of civil law. Thus, the law
to be applied in regard to the capacity of the Catalonian woman in
this example is not the law of the Civil Code, but the law contained
in the civil compilation of Catalonia, wherein the nullity of such a
contract of suretyship is expressly declared in article 332(1). In the
Decision of June 28, 1968, the Supreme Court declared that the "common law" to which article 50 of the Commercial Code refers "is the
Catalonian law integrated into its compilation." The Supreme Court
makes it definitely clear in that decision that the ius commune to which
the Commercial Code refers is that contained in the body of regional
laws, and not that contained in the Civil Code.
The Scope of Application of "Common Law"
to Commercial Contracts
It is the view of some jurists that in commercial contracts the
"common law," or ius commune, takes effect not only as suppletive
law, but also as the law applicable ab initio, since the general principles that govern all contractual matters are contained within it. This
opinion is reconciled with the literal meaning of article 50, which refers
to the general rules of "common law," and with the fact that the Commercial Code itself is very frugal in the enunciation of general rules.
On the other hand, the differences between those few general rules
contained in Title IV of Book I of the Commercial Code and those
of the ius commune were diminished considerably with the promulgation of the Civil Code. The most appreciable differences refer mainly
to contracts executed by correspondence (Com. Code arts. 54, 1262(2)),
nullity for the breach of an obligation (Com. Code arts. 61, 1124(3),
delay in payment (Com. Code art. 63; Civ. Code art. 1100), and the
demand for performance of an obligation which contains no stipulated
maturity date (Com. Code art. 62; Civ. Code arts. 113, 1128). These
are only a few simple examples involving a literal comparison between the texts of the dispositions contained in the Commercial Code
and those of the Civil Code; certainly, a nore extensive and comprehensive comparison would reveal more significant differences in
the rules contained in each. The concurrent application of ius commune and commercial law in matters involving commercial contracts
leads to three major conclusions.
In the first place, the meaning of the relation between both normative systems is determined not only by the literal meaning of article 50 of the Commercial Code, but also, and above all, by the reduced
number of general rules contained in legislation governing contractual matters. While in theory the provisions of the Commercial Code
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and those of special laws should be applied ab initio, in practice such
contracts will be governed basically by the general rules of the ius
commune. In this respect, one Spanish jurist points out that, although
commercial law indicates when a contract of sale is commercial (art.
325), it does not indicate when a particular contract is a contract of
sale and that, although article 345 imposes upon the seller the obligation of eviction and warranty, it does not specify what that obligation consists of-all of those concepts are to be found in the Civil
Code. In the second place, one should keep in mind that the coexistence of the ius commune and commercial law is constantly
modified as a result of the evolutions in both normative fields. From
another point of view, laws subsequently added to the Civil Code
modify the meaning of the relationship between ius commune and commercial law. In this manner, the Usury Law of July 23, 1908 is extended by legislation to the contract of commercial loan, amplifying
the scope of the application of the ius commune to a matter governed
by an exceptional rule, i.e., a rule governing a particular transaction,
contained in the Commercial Code (art. 314(1)). If the Usury Law, as
interpreted in this way, represents an approximation of the ius commune, the new law governing companies implies a withdrawal from
the general rules of the Civil Code in this regard. Finally, it can be
observed that the connection between ius commune and commercial
law in matters of contract is not established only on the statutory
level. A very clear example of how the general rules of the ius commune come to bear upon contracts dictated by commercial practice
(the "uses" of commerce) is the contract involving accounts current
that has been regulated jurisprudentially by the Supreme Court.
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